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WERE THEY ON A BREAK? THE THIRD CIRCUIT TRIES TO
PROVIDE CLARITY IN MEALTIME COMPENSATION
CASES IN BABCOCK v. BUTLER COUNTY
ARIANNA K. MCLAUGHLIN*
“Time is money.”1
I. WHOSE TIME IS IT ANYWAY? AN INTRODUCTION TO MEAL PERIODS AND
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Lunch breaks are important.2  For many, a lunch break is the oppor-
tunity to get a breath of fresh air, sneak in some exercise, run a few er-
rands, or even take a quick nap.3  In these situations the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to compensate employees for
time they are working, but not for the time they are not.4  As it applies to a
meal period, the FLSA requires compensation if an employee is on a bona-
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A. 2014, Bryant University.  I would like to thank the staff of the VILLANOVA LAW
REVIEW for their guidance and thoughtful feedback during this writing process.  I
would also like to thank my parents, Donna and Kostis, as well as my friends and
family for their support and encouragement.  Lastly, to Keegan Burke and our
dog, Riley-Wilbert: this brief would not have been possible without your
unwavering love, patience, humor, and kindness.  Thank you.
1. See Benjamin Franklin, Advice to a Young Tradesman (1748), reprinted in THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 51, 51 (Ralph L. Ketcham ed., 2003)
(1965) (“Remember that TIME is Money.”).
2. See Karen Pallarito, Why Taking a Break at Work Makes You a Better Employee,
HEALTH.COM (Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.health.com/home/workday-breaks-
help-employees-reboot-researchers-say [https://perma.cc/QYK5-EHPH] (report-
ing workers who take breaks “have more stamina and fewer aches and pain when
they return to work”); Ruchika Tulshyan, Why Your Lunch Break Is Sacred, FORBES
(Aug. 22, 2014, 10:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ruchikatulshyan/2014/
08/22/why-your-lunch-break-is-sacred/#6be95ad56f51 [https://perma.cc/4CBK-
SSRL] (noting breaks increase worker productivity and health); We’re Not Taking
Enough Lunch Breaks.  Why That’s Bad for Business, NPR: THE SALT (Mar. 5, 2015,
10:47 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/03/05/390726886/were-
not-taking-enough-lunch-breaks-why-thats-bad-for-business [https://perma.cc/
LV44-TMLW] (noting changes in environment taken during breaks boosts creativ-
ity and innovation in workplace).
3. See Babcock v. Butler Cty., 806 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2015) (listing activi-
ties Butler County Prison employees would have utilized during lunch period ab-
sent restrictions).
4. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201–19 (West 2012); see also Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc.,
331 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The FLSA requires an employer to record, credit,
and compensate employees for all of the time which the employer requires or
permits employees to work.”), aff’d on reh’g, 360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2004), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
(553)
1
McLaughlin: Were They on a Break? The Third Circuit Tries to Provide Clarity
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
554 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 553
fide lunch break and is working, but if the employee is idle during the
break, they will not be compensated.5
However, if there is one thing the television show Friends has taught
us, it is that it is not always clear whether people are, or are not, on a
break.6  The line between work and play begins to blur when employees
have meal breaks, but face employer-imposed restrictions during that
time.7  In these situations, it becomes unclear whether an employer’s fail-
ure to compensate an employee constitutes an FLSA violation.8  In Babcock
v. Butler County,9 the Third Circuit aimed to resolve some of the complex-
ity over determining compensation for mealtime breaks.10
In Babcock, corrections officers were permitted a lunch period.11  Nev-
ertheless, during that time, the officers were required to remain in uni-
form, sit near emergency equipment, respond to any on-going
emergencies, and were unable to leave the prison absent special permis-
sion by the warden.12  The Third Circuit held that whether an employee
must be compensated for a meal period  is determined by the predom-
inant benefit test (PBT) that requires compensation only if the em-
ployer receives the predominant benefit of the time.13  Considering the
freedoms the officers maintained during their break and the existence
of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the parties, the
court held the break period predominantly benefited the employees.14
5. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (2017) (describing activities considered work and
thus not bona fide meal period); see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 204 (delegating authority to
Department of Labor to administer FLSA).
6. See Friends: The One Where Ross and Rachel Take a Break (NBC television
broadcast Feb. 13, 1997).
7. See Johnathan A. Segal, Legal Trends: Give Me a Break, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES.
MGMT. (Dec. 1, 2013), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/
pages/1213-flsa-breaks.aspx [https://perma.cc/ELB2-PBDW] (detailing various
lunch-break scenarios and potential FLSA violations).
8. See id. (discussing ambiguity over when compensation for lunch breaks is
required under FLSA). See generally Babcock, 806 F.3d at 155 (describing scenario
where three-fourths of lunch break is compensated and one-fourth is not).
9. 806 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2015).
10. See generally id. at 155 (“This appeal raises the issue of whether a portion of
time for the Butler County Prison corrections officers’ meal periods is compensa-
ble under the FLSA.”).
11. See id. (explaining that each corrections officer received one lunch break
per one eight and one-quarter hours shift).
12. See id. (listing restrictions imposed upon employees).
13. See id. at 157–58 (affirming district court’s adoption of PBT and granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss because court could not “find that the officers were
‘primarily engaged in work-related duties’ during . . . mealtime”).
14. See id. at 158 (holding collectively-bargained lunch period predominantly
benefited employees).  A collective bargaining agreement is a contract on employ-
ment derived from negotiations between the employer and its organized employ-
ees. See Collective Bargaining, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collective_bargaining [https://perma.cc/8CQ4-5WF9]
(last visited Jan. 15, 2016) (defining CBA).
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Thus, the court found that compensation was not required under the
FLSA.15
This Casebrief will discuss the Third Circuit’s holding, arguing that
despite the court’s attempt to clarify when meal time is compensable, the
decision still provides little guidance to attorneys and parties in future
cases.16  Part II of this Casebrief will review the FLSA and the regulatory
and judicial approaches to defining “work” under the FLSA.17  Part III will
focus on the facts, procedural history, and holding in Babcock, including a
discussion of the dissenting opinion.18  Part IV of this Casebrief will argue
the adoption of the PBT has not adequately clarified when meal time com-
pensation is required because Babcock’s unique facts do not easily extend
to other cases and because it is unknown how much weight the court af-
forded the CBA in evaluating the PBT.19  Part IV will also discuss the im-
plications of Babcock on both sides of the employer-employee relationship,
offering advice to practitioners.20  Lastly, Part V concludes by emphasizing
that although Babcock provides Third Circuit courts with some direction in
adopting the PBT, the legal landscape of mealtime compensability re-
mains relatively uncertain.21
II. LET’S “WORK” IT OUT: A BACKGROUND OF THE FLSA
AND THE WORD IT FAILED TO DEFINE
While the FLSA requires compensation for time employees are work-
ing, the statute never elaborates on what is considered “work.”22  As a re-
15. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 158 (finding time predominantly benefited
employees).
16. For a discussion of why it is difficult to determine how courts will rule in
future cases based on the holding in Babcock, see infra notes 106–34 and accompa-
nying text.
17. For a discussion of the existing statutory guidelines pertaining to em-
ployee compensation, and the judicial and regulatory guidance of the application
of the existing statutory requirements, see infra notes 22–55 and accompanying
text.
18. For a discussion of the facts, procedural history, and opinions in Babcock,
see infra notes 56–102 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the ambiguity that persists in the aftermath of Babcock
see infra notes 106–34 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the implications of Babcock on mealtime breaks from
both an employer and an employee perspective, see infra notes 135–60 and accom-
panying text.
21. For a further discussion of the impact of the Court’s holding, see infra
notes 161–64 and accompanying text.
22. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 204 (West 2012) (delegating authority to Department of
Labor to interpret FLSA); 29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (2017) (“The [FLSA], however, con-
tains no definition of ‘work.’”); Tennessee Coal Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944) (defining “work” as “physical or mental exertion
(whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursed
necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.”); see
also Adam R. Long, When Must Meal Breaks Be Paid? Third Circuit Clarifies FLSA Test,
PA. LAB. & EMP. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.palaborandemploymentblog
.com/2015/12/articles/wage-hour/mealbreaks/ [https://perma.cc/XQZ2-WS5S]
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sult, two separate methods for ascertaining “work” in mealtime
compensation cases have emerged.23  The Department of Labor (DOL)
offers one suggestion, stating that employees are “working” unless they are
relieved of all duties; this is referred to as the relieved of all duties
(ROAD) test.24  In contrast, several courts have held that employees are
“working” during a break when the time predominantly benefits the em-
ployer rather than the employee; this is known as the PBT.25
A. All Work and No Play Under the FLSA: The Requirements
of the Fair Labor Standards Act
In 1938, Congress passed the FLSA for the purpose of offering federal
protection to employees.26  The FLSA does not require employers to pro-
(noting the interpretation of what is work is a “murky issue.”).  For a further dis-
cussion of the Fair Labor Standards Act, see infra notes 26–33 and accompanying
text.
23. See Babcock v. Butler Cty., 806 F.3d 153, 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2015) (discuss-
ing two approaches to mealtime compensability and applying PBT approach); see
also Laura Lawless Robertson, There Really Is Such a Thing as a Free Lunch (for Employ-
ers), Says Third Circuit Court of Appeals, EMP. L. WORLDVIEW (Nov. 25, 2015), http://
www.employmentlawworldview.com/there-really-is-such-a-thing-as-a-free-lunch-for-
employers-says-third-circuit-court-of-appeals/ [https://perma.cc/XH4Z-NM9W]
(noting divergence of approaches may require the United States Supreme Court
to “conclusively resolve the dispute”).
24. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (2017) (“Bona fide meal periods are not work-
time. . . .  The employee must be completely relieved from duty for the purposes of
eating regular meals.”).  For a further discussion of the Department of Labor’s
relieved of all duties approach to meal period compensation, see infra notes 34–41
and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Alexander v. City of Chi., 994 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993)
(adopting predominant benefit test that considers “ ‘when the employee’s time is
not spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer.’” (quoting Lamon v. City
of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 1992))).  For a further discussion
of the judicially created predominant benefits test, see infra notes 42–55 and ac-
companying text.
26. See Brooklyn Savs. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945) (holding legis-
lative history of FLSA indicates Congressional intent to protect certain employee
groups from working conditions that “endangered the national health and well-
being”). Brooklyn Savings Bank further elaborated that Congress recognized that
the need to protect employees stemmed from “unequal bargaining power . . . be-
tween employer and employee” and thus “certain segments of the population re-
quired federal compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts . . . which
endangered” both the employees and the national economy. See id; see also Jason
K. Roberts, Be Thankful for Meal Breaks: Third Circuit Panel Adopts “Predominant Bene-
fit” Test For Meal Breaks Under the FLSA, RUBIN FORTUNATO & HARBISON P.C. (Nov.
25, 2015), http://www.rubinfortunato.com/article/thankful-meal-breaksthird-cir-
cuit-panel-adopts-predominant-benefit-test/ [https://perma.cc/42SB-GPGX]
(noting FLSA is “integral part of this country’s employment laws.”); Sammy Sugi-
ura Jr., Third Circuit Addresses Whether Meal Period Restrictions Are Violations Under the
FLSA in Babcock v. Butler County, EMP. L. BLOTTER (Dec. 16, 2015), http://em-
ploymentlawblotter.com/wordpress/2015/12/16/third-circuit-addresses-whether-
meal-period-restrictions-are-violations-under-the-flsa-in-babcock-vs-butler-county/
[https://perma.cc/XR5V-E4XQ] (noting employee class action FLSA actions are
“on the rise.”).
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vide employees with meal periods; nevertheless, some states require
mandatory meal breaks and some employers voluntarily choose to provide
their employees with breaks.27  The FLSA requires that employers com-
pensate employees for time worked.28  As a result, once an employer offers
its employees a meal break, the employer may become liable under the
FLSA.29
To illustrate, imagine an employer provides an uncompensated lunch
break to an employee.30  If the employer requires the employee to remain
at their workstation and continue working during their uncompensated
break, the FLSA requires the employer to compensate the employee for
27. See Minimum Length of Meal Period Required Under State Law for Adult Employ-
ees in Private Sector, WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www
.dol.gov/whd/state/meal.htm#foot1 [https://perma.cc/7WGB-GUJH] (noting
states that have meal period regulations include: California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, and Rhode
Island).  Despite the lack of formalized findings on the amount of employers offer-
ing lunch and meal breaks, it is believed that many employers in fact provide some
type of meal break for their employees. See Allison Doyle, What Meals and Rest
Breaks Do Employees Get?, THE BALANCE: JOB SEARCHING (Oct. 19, 2016), https://
www.thebalance.com/what-meal-and-rest-breaks-do-employees-get-2060466
[https://perma.cc/H4AX-TN3K] (“many companies do provide breaks.”); Lisa
Guerin, When Must Employers Provide Meal and Rest Breaks, NOLO.COM, http://www
.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-must-employers-provide-meal-rest-breaks
.html [https://perma.cc/ZD4A-HHPV] (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) (noting “[m]ost
employers allow employees to take a lunch break”).  Required meal times, includ-
ing stipulations for whether or not the time is compensated, may also be created
through collective bargaining agreements.  For definition of a collective bargain-
ing agreement, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
28. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (requiring compensation for employees who “work”
during meal period); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 63–64
(2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that employer could be liable for not compensating
employees for a meal period in which “work” was performed); Guerin, supra note
27 (noting FLSA requires employers to pay for time worked, even if time is desig-
nated as meal period).
29. See Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“[The] FLSA requires remuneration for meal periods during which a police of-
ficer is unable [sic] comfortably and adequately pass the mealtime because the
officer’s time or attention is devoted primarily to official responsibilities.”);
Guerin, supra note 27 (warning employers that failure to compensate employees
for time worked during uncompensated meal period could result in FLSA
liability).
30. See Hilery Simpson, Paid Lunch and Paid Rest Time Benefits from the Employee
Benefits Survey, 1979–93, COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS, Dec. 1996, at 19
(displaying results of survey of employees who do and who do not receive paid
lunch breaks).
Based on the results of the 1979–93 Employee Benefits Survey, it appears em-
ployers are more likely to offer uncompensated lunch breaks than compensated
ones.  See id. (reporting that in 1993, only 9% of medium and large private estab-
lishing employees had paid lunch time, in 1992 only 10% of state and local govern-
ment employees received paid lunch time, and in 1992 only 9% of small private
establishment employees received paid lunch breaks).
5
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their time worked.31  Nevertheless, when employees have lunch breaks but
face certain restrictions during that period, the line between “work” and
“break” blurs.32  In these situations, whether the employer must compen-
sate the employee is unclear.33
B. The 9 to 5: The Department of Labor’s Relieved of All Duties Approach
In an attempt to clarify the ambiguity of when an employee’s lunch
break is compensable, the Department of Labor promulgated regulations
to aid in the interpretation and enforcement of the FLSA.34  One such
regulation defines a “bona fide meal period.”35  The DOL explains that a
meal period is not compensable if the employee is not “completely re-
lieved from duty” for that period.36  If an employee is “required to per-
form any duties, whether active or inactive,” the employee is not relieved
of their duties and their time must be compensated.37
31. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2012) (subjecting employers to liability for
failing to compensate employees for lunch break where sufficient work was
preformed); see also Samantha Kemp, Do Companies Have to Pay Employees for a Lunch
Break?, AZ CENTRAL, http://yourbusiness.azcentral.com/companies-pay-employ-
ees-lunch-break-6802.html [https://perma.cc/9QSK-3D5R] (last visited Feb. 13,
2017) (providing examples of times when employee is working during break, such
as when employee “eats lunch in his office and has to take work phone calls” or if
an employee must “be on duty at his work station”).  In interpreting the definition
of work under the FLSA, the Supreme Court has held that work means the “physi-
cal or mental exertion . . . controlled or required by the employer and pursued
necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer.” See Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944) (defining work).
The Supreme Court has further elaborated that what constitutes work is a highly
fact-specific inquiry, and even employees on inactive duty could be subject to pro-
tection under the FLSA if their time predominantly benefited the employer, for
instance, by remaining on call. See also Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126,
133 (1944) (“[A]n employer . . . may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing
but wait for something to happen . . . [r]eadiness to serve may be hired . . . and
time spent lying in wait for threats to the safety of the employer’s property may be
treated by the parties as a benefit to the employer.  Whether time is spent predom-
inately for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a question dependent
upon all the circumstances of the case.”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944) (analyzing whether waiting is considered work).
32. For an example of a situation where an employer’s restrictions on an em-
ployee’s lunch break may make it unclear whether the employee is working, see
infra notes 60–67 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Alexander v. City of Chi., 944 F.2d 333, 334–35 (7th Cir. 1993)
(weighing difficulty of whether police officers who had substantial restrictions on
what they could do during meals breaks were actually “working” or on “break”).
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a) (2017) (differentiating work periods from rest
periods with examples).
35. See id. (defining “bona fide meal period” as break that is not “worktime”
and must at least be thirty minutes or more).
36. See id. (announcing relieved of all duties approach).
37. See id. (explaining relieved of all duties approach).  As an example of the
latter circumstance, in the regulation, the DOL explains, “an office employee who
is required to eat at his desk . . . is working while eating.” See id. (citations omit-
ted); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text explaining that the FLSA ren-
6
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Whether an employee’s mealtime break is considered “work” hinges
on whether the employer has been “completely relieved of duty.”38  The
ROAD test requires a narrow application, such that if an employee has to
perform any work-related functions during their meal period, they must
be compensated.39  While the ROAD approach is specifically derived from
the DOL’s regulation, courts are not required to use it because it does not
carry the force of law; rather, the regulation exists solely as persuasive au-
thority.40  As such, most courts have not adopted the ROAD approach.41
ders employers liable for failing to compensate employees that are required to
work through lunch.
38. See Howard S. Lavin & Elizabeth E. DiMichele, Split Circuit: When Are Meals
Compensable Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 42 EMPLOYEE RELS. L.J., Summer
2016, at 4 (referring to this analysis as “relieved from all duties test”).  In Kohlheim
v. Glynn County, the Eleventh Circuit utilized a variation of this test, asserting that
“the essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide
meal period . . . is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for the
purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”  915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir.
1990).
39. See Powders, Kinder & Keeney, Courts Disagree About When Employers Must
Pay Workers for Meal Breaks, 3 No. 12. R.I. EMP. L. LETTER 7 (1999) (describing
ROAD test); Maureen Minehan, Third Circuit Sides with Employers on Unpaid Meal
Breaks, 32 No. 26 EMP. ALERT NL 1 (Dec. 24, 2015) (explaining employee who has
to eat lunch at their desk is entitled to compensation even if they are not actively
engaged in assignments); see also Kohlheim, 915 F.2d at 1481 (holding firefighters
were not completely relieved of duty during mealtime when they were required to
remain on site and respond to emergency calls).  The 11th Circuit stated:
During meal times the firefighters were required to remain at the station
and were subject to emergency calls.  The record makes clear that the
firefighters were subject to significant affirmative responsibilities during
these periods.  The mealtime restrictions benefit the county by ensuring
maintenance of an available pool of competent firefighters for immediate
response to emergency situations.  The firefighters are subject to real lim-
itations on their freedom during mealtime which inure to the benefit of
the county; accordingly, the three mealtime periods are compensable
under FLSA regulations for overtime purposes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
40. See Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“Although not controlling on courts, such regulations do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).  The Massachu-
setts Superior Court has recently chosen to adopt the Relieved of All Duties Test in
DeVito v. Longwood Security Services, Inc.  No. SUCV201301724BLS1, 2016
WL8200495 (Mass. Supp. Dec. 23, 2016); see Barry J. Miller & Anne S. Bider, Massa-
chusetts Superior Court Adopts Stringent Standard for Unpaid Meal Breaks Under State
Law, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/
MA011317-LE [https://perma.cc/3UU2-U29].
41. See, e.g., Babcock v. Butler Cty., 806 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting
majority of courts of appeals utilize PBT rather than relieved of all duties
approach).
7
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C. All in a Day’s Work: The Judicially Conceived Predominant Benefit Test
Currently, the PBT is used by a majority of circuit courts of appeal.42
Unlike the ROAD test, the PBT is a judicially created test based on the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Armour & Co. v. Wantock43 and Skidmore v.
Swift & Co.44  The PBT determines mealtime compensability by analyzing
42. See id. at 156 (compiling cases to reveal PBT has been used by Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); see also Reich,
121 F.3d at 65 (noting their use of PBT is consistent with DOL meal regulation
because regulation must be interpreted practically and in flexible manner); Roy v.
Cty. of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating PBT is “the most
appropriate standard for compensability [because it] is a flexible and realistic one
where we determine, whether, on balance, employees use mealtime for their own,
or for their employer’s benefit.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Ber-
nard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 266 (5th  Cir. 1998) (utilizing PBT and
noting factors that can be considered include “the limitations and restrictions
placed upon the employees, the extent to which those restrictions benefit the em-
ployer, the duties for which the employee is held responsible during the meal
period, and the frequency in which meal periods are interrupted.”); Avery v. City of
Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding the PBT applies to law
enforcement personnel); Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sherriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 534–35
(8th Cir. 1993) (stating PBT comports with Supreme Court’s definition of work,
and relieved of all duties test “lacks persuasive force” because it is inconsistent with
“Supreme Court’s direction that courts take a practical approach based on the
unique facts of each case”); Alexander v. City of Chi., 994 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting the predominant benefit test “sensibly integrates developing case
law with the regulations’ language and purpose”); Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972
F.2d 1145, 1157 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[A] law enforcement officer is considered to be
completely relieved from duty . . . when the employee’s time is not spent predomi-
nately for the benefit of the employer.”); Hill v. United States, 751 F.2d 810, 814
(6th Cir. 1984) (noting difficulty of relieved of all duties standard is that it could
require compensation at all hours in situations where workers were required to
bring tools or work materials home with them).  In addition to the various circuit
courts, the PBT has also been adopted and applied by courts within the Third
Circuit. See Aboud v. City of Wildwood, No. 12-7195, 2013 WL 2156248, at *6
(D.N.J. May 17, 2013); Prise v. Alderwoods Grp., Inc., 817 F.Supp.2d 651, 666–67
(W.D. Pa. 2011); Lugo v. Farmer’s Pride Inc., 802 F. Supp.2d 598, 613 (E.D. Pa.
2011); Oakes v. Pennsylvania, 871 F. Supp. 797, 799–800 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
43. 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
44. 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944) (“Hours worked are not limited to the time
spent in active labor but include time given by the employee toi [sic] the em-
ployer” (citation omitted)); see also Ellen C. Kearns, “Off-The-Clock” Time—When Is It
Compensable?, INT’L LAW. NETWORK, http://www.iln.com/bullet_iln_two_three/
leipaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH7V-9A3L] (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) (stating
PBT is derived from “principals from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Armour . . .
and Skidmore, which predate adoption of the [DOL’s] regulation”).  These two
cases mandate that the determination of what constitutes work is fact-bound and
based on the totality of the circumstances. See id.  Together, these cases hold that
work under the FLSA requires “physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome
or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and pri-
marily for the benefit of the employer and his business.” See Reich, 121 F.3d at 64
(quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598
(1944)).  Additionally, the twin Supreme Court cases mandate that the determina-
tion of what is “work” is determined on a case-by-case basis according to the totality
of the circumstances. See id. (citing Armour, 323 U.S. at 133 and Skidmore, 323 U.S.
at 136).  The Supreme Court further elaborates that whether time should be con-
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss3/4
2017] CASEBRIEF 561
whether employees are predominantly engaged in work-related activities
during their mealtime break.45  Under the PBT, if the employee is the
primary beneficiary of the meal period, the time is not compensable.46
Conversely, if the break time predominantly benefits the employer, the
FLSA requires compensation.47
The PBT is substantially less restrictive than the ROAD approach.48
To illustrate, under the ROAD test, if the employer benefits at all from the
break, compensation is likely required; under the PBT, the employer may
benefit from the time, but as the long as the break predominantly benefits
the employee, compensation is not required.49  For example, in Alexander
v. City of Chicago,50 police officers were subject to a variety of restrictions
sidered work hinges on “the degree to which the employee is free to engage in
personal activities” during the break. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138 (internal quota-
tions omitted).
45. See Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing “the proper standard for determining the compensability of a meal period is
whether the officer is primarily . . . engaged in work-related duties during meal
periods.” (internal quotation omitted)).
46. See Bart N. Sisk & Brent E. Siler, Lunch, Interrupted: Compensating Employees
for Work During Meal Periods, 31 No. 1 TENN. EMP. L. LETTER 4. (2016) (explaining
when employers must compensate employees for lunch breaks under FLSA); Ste-
phanie J. Peet & Katherine Thomas Batista, Officers’ Meal Breaks Not Compensable,
Third Circuit Finds, Adopts Predominant Benefit Test, JACKSON LEWIS P.C. (Dec. 8,
2015), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/officers-meal-breaks-not-com-
pensable-third-circuit-finds-adopts-predominant-benefit-test [https://perma.cc/
GGF3-4NRL] (noting employees are not entitled to compensation when break
“may be spent doing activities of the employee’s choosing”); David Treibman,
Third Circuit: Meal Breaks for Employees’ “Predominant Benefit” Are Not Worktime, FISHER
PHILLIPS: WAGE & HOUR BLOG (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.fisherphillips.com/
Wage-and-Hour-Laws/Meal-Breaks-Predominant-Benefit-Not-Worktime [https://
perma.cc/3E8M-JT4G] (“[T]he prospects that a meal period will be viewed as be-
ing for an employee’s predominant benefit are greatest when an employee has
maximum freedom to use the breaktime as he or she sees fit.”).
47. See Sisk & Siler, supra note 46 (“[T]he court determines whether an em-
ployee is engaged in the performance of any substantial duties during her meal
period.”); see also Deborah H. Share, No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, PORZIO BROM-
BERG & NEWMAN P.C. (Dec. 2015), http://www.pbnlaw.com/media/622883/elm-
december-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGF7-7M8A] (indicating break may
predominantly benefit employer if employer places specific restrictions on employ-
ees during break that restrict employees’ personal freedom).
48. See, e.g., Nicholas F. Ortiz, MA Court Adopts Relieved-of-All-Duties Standard for
Meal Breaks, MASSWAGELAW.COM (Dec. 27, 2016), http://masswagelaw.com/blog/
index.php/ma-court-relieved-of-all-duties-standard/ [https://perma.cc/G5L4-
GERZ] (advising because PBT is more lenient than relieved-of-all-duties approach,
employer can make employee perform some duties on breaks, pay nothing, and
get free labor); see also George A. Voegele Jr., Recent Prison Guard Case Frees Employ-
ers from Meal Period Uncertainty Under the FLSA, COZEN O’CONNOR (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.cozen.com/news-resources/publications/2015/recent-prison-guard-
case-frees-employers-from-meal-period-uncertainty-under-the-flsa [https://perma
.cc/ARA3-CRDU] (dubbing the PBT “employer-friendly” as compared to ROAD).
49. See id. (addressing how ROAD approach and PBT could come to contrary
results in same scenario).
50. 994 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993).
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on their thirty-minute meal break and had to remain on-call.51  Under the
ROAD test, the police officers were clearly entitled to compensation; how-
ever, on remand, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois found that under the PBT, even though the officers had to be
responsive, they were “fully able to ‘comfortably and adequately pass the
mealtime’” and were not entitled to compensation.52
As Alexander shows, determining whether the break predominantly
benefits the employer or the employee is highly contingent on the facts of
each case.53  Courts may consider any variety of factors in determining
51. See id. at 334–35 (“[P]laintiffs’ complaint puts forth an extensive list of
requirements to which the officers must adhere during their meal breaks: officers
must receive permission—frequently denied—to take a meal period, and cannot
take that period during the last hour of a shift assignment; . . . they must remain in
full uniform . . . officers are not permitted to take meals at locations other than
establishments serving food . . . no more than two officers may be present in the
same establishment; officers must refrain from conduct that the department
deems inappropriate for an officer . . . .”).
52. See In re Chi. Police Dept. F.L.S.A. Meal Period Litig., No. 89 C 9354, 1995
WL 144500, at *7–10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1995) (applying PBT on remand and find-
ing that despite restrictions placed on officers, their meal periods sufficiently
benefitted them to a degree where compensation was not required).
53. See id. (considering four different factors to determine who meal period
actually benefitted).  In determining whether the time is for the predominant ben-
efit of the employee or the employer, courts must assess the totality of the circum-
stances. See Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 264–65 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding evidence supported finding of compensation when meat-packing employ-
ees were required to maintain their radios and tools during break, could not leave
the premises, and lunches were frequently interrupted by work-related duties); Roy
v. Cty. of Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 1998) (compensation not re-
quired for workers that remained on call and ready to respond to emergencies
during their meal breaks but could otherwise leave site as long as they remained
within eighty-two square miles); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d
58, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (determining craft employees are owed compensation for
their meal period when their employer required them to remain on site to watch
company equipment); Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sherriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 537 (8th
Cir. 1993) (holding meal period was not for predominant benefit of employer
when police officers had to respond to emergency calls and answer civilian ques-
tions but were otherwise unrestricted); Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337,
1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding compensation was not required when officers only
restrictions were staying in uniform, leaving their radios on, and not leaving their
jurisdiction); Alexander, 994 F.2d at 334–35 (considering whether compensation
was required for officers who were required to remain in uniform, on site, absent
frequently denied permission to leave, and required to refrain from certain con-
duct such as reading non-work related publications, napping, and consuming alco-
hol); Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
compensation was required when police officers had to be reachable by telephone,
respond to emergencies, answer “citizen inquires,” remain within city limits, and
not “conduct personal business errands”); Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d
430, 432 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding meal time predominantly benefited police of-
ficers who were able to leave the station and eat at a location of their choosing, but
were required to answer citizen questions, and had to disclose their location in
case their service were required); Hill v. United States, 751 F.2d 810, 815 (6th Cir.
1984) (holding compensation not required for postal employees who remained
accountable for mail and receipts during their designated lunch breaks).
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whether the time predominantly benefits the employee or the employer.54
However, courts have diverged on whether the existence of a CBA may be
a factor considered in a FLSA mealtime compensation case.55
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT TAKES ON THE JOB OF CLARIFYING
MEALTIME COMPENSATION CASES
In Babcock, the Third Circuit adopted the PBT.56  In applying the
PBT, the court factored in both the existence of a CBA and the restrictions
imposed upon the officers in Babcock.57  The court held the break in ques-
tion was not subject to compensation because it did not predominantly
benefit the employer.58  The dissent argued that while the PBT was the
proper test, the majority erred in their application of the PBT by improp-
erly dismissing the suit, overvaluing the existence of a CBA, and refusing
to permit the plaintiffs to engage in additional discovery.59
54. See, e.g., Babcock v. Butler Cty., 806 F.3d 153, 155, 157–58 (3d Cir.
2015)(commenting that some relevant factors include whether employees are per-
mitted to leave their work station or frequency of work-related interruptions to
employee’s break, but also emphasizing importance of CBA language); see also
Kohlheim v. Glynn Cty., 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining how to
determine whether meal period is bona fide meal period or compensable rest pe-
riod); Mark Stanisz, Third Circuit Rules that “Predominant Benefit” Test Determines
FLSA Meal Period Compensability, DUANE MORRIS INST. (Dec. 3, 2015), http://
duanemorrisinstitute.com/blog/?p=978#.WGwNh3eZO1s [https://perma.cc/
3LTT-XYR8] (commenting PBT “turns on the balancing of multiple factors that
could lead reasonable minds to reach divergent conclusions about whether the
employer or the employee is the predominant beneficiary of a meal period”).
55. Compare Leahy v. City of Chi., 96 F.3d 228, 232 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
CBA “is a defense to liability under the FLSA [such that a] plaintiff’s suit cannot
succeed”), with Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 264–65 (5th Cir. 1998)
(arguing Leahy’s holding that CBA can act as a defense is “preposterous,” and a
plaintiff’s “right to pursue a suit in the FLSA is completely independent from their
rights under the CBA”).  In general, some courts have allowed a CBA to be used a
complete defense to FLSA liability, while other courts have refused to recognize
the CBA at all as a factor in determining whether time is compensable. See, e.g.,
Leahy, 96 F.3d at 232.
56. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 156 (announcing use of PBT over ROAD
approach).
57. See id. at 157–58 (evaluating plaintiff’s claim to determine whether it was
sufficient to state claim upon which relief could be granted).
58. See id. (finding time predominantly benefited employees).
59. See id. at 158 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (“Today the Majority holds that
Plaintiffs’ Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’) claims should be dismissed based
upon a flawed application of the predominant benefit test.”).  The dissent noted:
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs set forth sufficient allegations to state a
claim that their meal period should be considered compensable work
under the FLSA. For this reason alone, their claims should not have
been dismissed.  Further, while discounting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations,
the Majority decides this matter by overvaluing the CBA’s compensation
provisions—disregarding relevant Supreme Court precedent in the pro-
cess.  Ending this lawsuit now is clearly improper.  I respectfully dissent.
Id. at 162.
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A. The Breakdown: Facts and Procedure in Babcock
Sandra Babcock, a corrections officer at the Butler County Prison,
brought a collective action (plaintiffs) against Butler County for failing to
properly compensate current and former employees for unpaid break
time.60  Under the CBA entered into by the corrections officers and the
prison, officers were required to take a one-hour lunch break, forty-five
minutes of which was compensated.61  During the uncompensated fifteen
minutes, employees were unable to leave the prison absent special permis-
sion by the warden and were required to remain on-site, in uniform, and
located near equipment in order to respond to emergencies.62  The plain-
tiffs argued they were essentially on-duty during those fifteen minutes and
thus should be compensated under the FLSA.63
The defendant responded to the plaintiffs’ complaint by filing a mo-
tion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, claiming the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.64  In evaluating the claim, the United States District Court for
60. See id. at 155 (explaining Babcock was named plaintiff in putative class
action of corrections officers).
61. See id. (stating that CBA between plaintiffs and Butler County Prison pro-
vided one hour meal periods per shift).  The CBA, in relevant part, stated:
Eight and one quarter (81/4) consecutive hours of work shall constitute a
work shift . . . . The lunch period shall be a duty-free period of one (1)
hour (three-quarters (3/4) of an hour (45 minutes) of which will be paid,
and one-quarter (1/4) of and [sic] hour (15 minutes) of which will be
unpaid.)  If the duty-free period is interrupted, the time will be compen-
sable.  Employees must remain within the facility during the lunch period
unless authorized to leave by the Warden/Deputy Warden.
Babcock v. Butler Cty., No. 12CV394, 2012 WL 3877612, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 6,
2012) (quoting trial court’s motion to dismiss opinion).
62. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 155 (listing restrictions on officers).
63. See id. (noting plaintiffs claim  they are entitled to compensation for fif-
teen-minute period under FLSA).
64. See Babcock v. Butler Cty, No. 12CV394, 2014 WL 688122, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 21, 2014), order aff’d, 806 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2015); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6) (listing “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” as
defense which may be raised by motion).  Prior to this motion, the defendant had
successfully filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings under 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Babcock, 2012
WL 3877612, at *2.  The court upheld the defendant’s motion because the plain-
tiffs failed to comply with their CBA, which required a “four step mandatory griev-
ance procedure” including arbitration for disputes. See id. at *2–3. (providing
reasoning for granting motion to dismiss).  The court held the CBA, which man-
dated the grievance process for “any dispute . . . concerning the wages, hours and
working conditions of employees covered by this [CBA],” included Babcock’s
claim. See id. at *4.  The court ordered the plaintiffs to “exhaust all their adminis-
trative remedies” in accordance with the CBA procedures prior to bringing suit.
See id.  The plaintiff then submitted to the process outlined in the CBA, resulting
in an arbitration decision in favor of the defendant. See Babcock, 2014 WL 688122,
at *2 (explaining that plaintiffs filed motion to reopen following conclusion of
grievance procedures).  Shortly after, plaintiffs filed a “Motion to Lift the Stay and
a Motion for Conditional Collective Action Certification Pursuant to the FLSA”;
12
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the Western District of Pennsylvania first recognized that the Third Circuit
had yet to determine the proper standard for analyzing meal period
claims.65  Absent guidance from the Third Circuit, the district court de-
cided to use the PBT and granted the defendant’s motion, finding the
plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that they were deprived of the pre-
dominant benefit of their break.66  The plaintiffs appealed to the Third
Circuit, agreeing that the predominant benefit test was the correct stan-
dard but arguing their pleadings established a plausible claim for relief.67
B. Is It Worth It?  Let Me Work It: The Majority Reviews the Predominant
Benefit Test and Does Not Reverse It
The Third Circuit in Babcock formally adopted the PBT.68  In discuss-
ing its decision, the court highlighted that both parties in Babcock sup-
ported the use of the PBT and the test had been adopted by the vast
majority of circuit courts.69  The Third Circuit explained that the underly-
ing question behind the PBT of “whether the officer is primarily engaged
in work-related duties during meal periods” is determined “on a case-by-
case basis.”70  The Third Circuit also emphasized that while courts can
consider a variety of innumerable factors in coming to a decision, the “es-
sential consideration . . . is whether the employees are in fact relieved
from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”71
the defendant responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6). See id.
65. See Babcock, 2014 WL 688122, at *4 (“The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has not yet had an the opportunity to establish an applicable
test [for determining] whether a compensation agreement complies with [the
DOL’s bona fide] meal period regulation.” (citation omitted)).
66. See id. at *4–5 (explaining that majority of circuits employ PBT test and
parties agree that it should be governing rule).  In coming to this decision, the
court asserted that just because an employer is benefiting from certain restrictions
during a meal period, such as having the officers remain on site, does not necessa-
rily mean that the employee is working. See id. at *4–5  The district court found
the case comparable to Avery where employees were able to “spend their meal
breaks in any way they wish so long as they remain in uniform, leave their radios
on, and do not leave the jurisdiction.” See id. at *8 (discussing Avery v. City of
Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 1994)).  The court additionally remarked that
keeping the correction officers on site and in uniform is of “equal benefit” to the
employer and the employees because it ensures the safety of the officers by mitigat-
ing the likelihood of injury-inducing prison riots. See id. at *9.
67. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 156 (explaining that plaintiffs argued that even
though employer-friendly PBT applied, they still stated plausible claim).
68. See id. at 156 (announcing adoption of PBT in line with sister circuits).
69. See id. (recognizing majority of circuit courts that have adopted PBT and
views of parties to case who both supported use of PBT).
70. See id. at 156–57 (requiring that to determine “to whom the benefit of the
meal period inures” requires courts to consider the totality of the circumstances on
a case-by-case basis (citing Armour & Co v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944))).
71. See id. (citing Kohlheim v. Glynn Cty., 915 F.2d 1473, 1477 (11th Cir.
1990)) (explaining main inquiry in PBT analysis).
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Applying the newly adopted PBT to the case at hand, the Third Cir-
cuit acknowledged the variety of restrictions imposed upon the officers.72
Nevertheless, the court found that despite the restrictions, the break as a
whole still predominantly benefited the officers.73  The Third Circuit
came to this conclusion by comparing the facts of Babcock with other cases
involving meal time compensability and law-enforcement officers, namely
the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Alexander.74  The Third Circuit found the
allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint insufficient because, unlike in Alex-
ander, during breaks the employees could leave their desk, leave the prison
with permission, and did not face additional restrictions, such as limita-
tions on reading material.75
The Third Circuit also considered the CBA in concluding the break
predominantly benefited the employees.76  The court relied heavily on an-
other law-enforcement case, Leahy v. City of Chicago77 in coming to this
conclusion.78  In Leahy, the Seventh Circuit dismissed an FLSA compensa-
tion claim brought by police officers because of the existence of a CBA
that characterized the time as not compensable but provided for compen-
sation when work was performed.79  The Third Circuit explained that
while the CBA in Babcock did not contemplate the compensability of the
fifteen-minute period in dispute, the CBA required compensation for
work during time that would not otherwise be compensated.80  Based on
Leahy, the Third Circuit found that the CBA characterized the time as a
break and sufficiently protected the employees, noting “the FLSA requires
no more.”81  However, the Third Circuit stressed that a CBA is not a “de-
72. See id. at 155 (noting “number of restrictions” imposed on officers).
73. See id. at 157–58 (analyzing restrictions to determine whether break pre-
dominantly benefited plaintiffs or defendant).
74. See id. at 157 (“In comparison to the cadre of case law addressing meal-
time compensability in the law enforcement context, the allegations in Plaintiffs’
complaint do not suffice.”).
75. See id. 157–58 (addressing restrictions which may have converted break
into compensable work time).
76. See id. (addressing language and function of CBA between plaintiffs and
defendant).
77. 96 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1996).
78. See id. at 232 (holding that CBA is defense to FLSA liability for mealtime
compensation).
79. See id. at 232 (“[I]f the collective bargaining agreement’s guarantee of
overtime compensation for time worked in excess of eight hours in an eight-and-
one-half hour tour of duty protects Chicago police officers’ FLSA rights to over-
time compensation, then the agreement is a defense to liability under the FLSA
and the plaintiffs’ suit cannot succeed.”).
80. See id. at 232–33 (“The parties’ agreement therefore that generally an of-
ficer is not working during a meal period, but provides for appropriate compensa-
tion when an officer actually does work during the meal.”).
81. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157 (quoting Leahy, 96 F.3d at 232).
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fense to liability under the FLSA.”82  Rather, a CBA is another factor
courts may consider in determining the compensability of a meal
period.83
Considering the restrictions alleged in the complaint and the exis-
tence of the CBA, the Third Circuit found that the time predominantly
benefited the employees.84  Specifically, the Third Circuit held that the
restrictions did not prevent employees from “pass[ing] the mealtime com-
fortably.”85  As such, the Third Circuit found the plaintiffs did not suffi-
ciently state a claim upon which relief could be granted.86  The Third
Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the suit.87
C. Time to Break Up: The Dissent Departs from the Majority’s Application
of the Predominant Benefit Test
The dissent argued that the majority utilized a “flawed application” of
the PBT and came to the wrong conclusion in Babcock.88  First, the dissent
argued the plaintiffs should have survived the 12(b)(6) motion because
they raised a plausible claim that their meal periods were for the predomi-
nant benefit of the defendant.89  The dissent highlighted Reich v. Southern
82. See id. at 158 (quoting Leahy, 96 F.3d at 232) (noting that unlike in Leahy,
CBA is not dispositive in determining whether break period predominantly bene-
fits employers or employees).
83. See id. (discussing role of CBAs in evaluating meal time compensability
claims under PBT).  Responding to the dissent’s critique of the majority’s use of
the CBA, the majority explained:
[O]ur approach is consistent with the weight of precedent, considers the
CBA as one relevant—though not dispositive—factor . . . .  Although we
find the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Leahy useful for comparison, the
Dissent is correct that the instant case is distinguishable, which is why,
unlike the Leahy court, we do not hold that “the [collective bargaining]
agreement is a defense to liability under the FLSA.
Id. (citing Leahy, 96 F.3d at 232).  The court also noted that plaintiffs could negoti-
ate the compensability of the fifteen-minute period during the next collective bar-
gaining contract. See id.
84. See id. at 157–58 (holding that “on balance” break predominantly bene-
fited officers).
85. See id. at 158 (requiring “sufficient development of the facts to enable a
capable application of the appropriate predominant benefit standard, including a
determination of whether the officers are unable to pass the mealtime comfortably
because their time or attention is devoted primarily to official responsibilities” (cit-
ing Alexander v. City of Chi., 994 F.2d 333, 339 (7th Cir. 1993))).
86. See id. (“[W]e find that [employees] receive the predominant benefit of
the time in question and are not entitled to compensation for it under the FLSA
 . . . .  We will accordingly affirm the District Court’s order granting [defendant’s]
motion to dismiss.”).
87. See id. (dismissing suit for failure to state claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6)).
88. See id. at 158–62. (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (critiquing majority’s reason-
ing and holding).
89. See id. at 160 (containing heading which states, “Plaintiffs Raise a Plausible
Claim that Uninterrupted Meal Periods Are Compensable Work.”).
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New England Telecommunications Corp.90 that held workers who remained
on their worksite to watch company equipment during their meal period
were entitled to compensation.91  The dissent explained that Babcock bears
similarity to Reich in that had the plaintiffs not stayed at the prison during
their breaks, the defendant would have needed to hire additional employ-
ees to comply with regulations that require a certain ratio of officers to
inmates.92  As such, the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim and the
suit should not have been dismissed.93
The dissent also emphasized that the majority should have permitted
the plaintiffs to engage in discovery to support their claim.94  In support of
this argument, the dissent addressed the similarity between Babcock and
Alexander, noting both cases required employees to remain within a certain
designated area, in uniform, and ready to respond to emergencies.95  The
dissenting opinion acknowledges that Alexander contained some restric-
tions absent from Babcock, mainly a restriction on non-departmental publi-
cations.96  However, the dissent asserts that additional restrictions,
mirroring those in Alexander, would have been shown had the plaintiffs
90. 121 F.3d 58, 65–69 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding inactive work may still consti-
tute work under FLSA if time as whole is used for predominant benefit of em-
ployer rather than employee).
91. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 160–61 (finding Babcock analogous to Reich).  The
dissent further elaborated on Reich, explaining in that case the Second Circuit rea-
soned that although the workers were performing a separate function than their
usual job by watching company equipment during the break, the requirement that
workers ate lunch on site predominantly benefited the employer. See id. (compar-
ing case to Reich).  The dissent further noted that the Second Circuit found that
had the employees in Reich not been present on site during the meal-period, the
employers would have had to hire additional workers to watch and safe-keep the
company’s property. See id.  (“[B]y not compensating these workers, [the em-
ployer] is effectively receiving free labor.” (citing Reich, 121 F.3d at 65)).
92. See id. at 161 (explaining “state regulations require certain staffing levels
be maintained at all correctional facilities at all times . . . .  [W]ithout Plaintiffs’
presence at the facility during meals, Defendant could be required to hire others
during that time period.” (footnote omitted)).  Although the dissent cites to a
Pennsylvania statute, the dissent notices that the “specific standards set for the
[Defendant] are not in the record at this time; this is . . . [a] type of fact-gathering
that may be conducted during discovery.” See id. at 161 n.6.
93. See id. 160–61 (emphasizing plaintiffs made plausible claim such that de-
fendant’s 12(b)(6) motion should not have been sustained).
94. See id. at 159 (“Although the Majority acknowledges the fact-intensive and
circumstance-specific nature of the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry under the
predominant benefit test . . . the Majority does not permit the Plaintiffs in this case
to conduct the discovery that would permit them access to the facts and circum-
stances to meet that standard.”).
95. See id. at 161 (concluding restrictions in both Babcock and Alexander re-
quired employees to “maintain a physical and mental readiness primarily for the
benefit of their employer”).
96. See id. at 161 n.7 (explaining that restriction on reading materials that
Alexander plaintiffs faced should not be held against Babcock plaintiffs because simi-
lar restrictions could come out in discovery).
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been permitted to engage in discovery.97  The dissent argued the majority
should have permitted additional discovery before dismissing the plain-
tiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim.98
Lastly, the dissent argued that the CBA should not have been consid-
ered as an analytical factor and the majority improperly relied on Leahy.99
The dissent distinguishes the cases by noting that the CBA in Babcock, un-
like in Leahy, did not grant an arbitrator the power to determine FLSA
compliance, as the two are separate issues which should not impact one
another.100  Additionally, the dissent commented that general reliance on
Leahy may be legally unsound given that the holding is not widely sup-
97. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 161 (noting “the Majority’s reliance on Alexander
to compel a different result here is misplaced”).  The dissent points out that re-
strictions found in Alexander, such as the fact that employees were restricted from
reading non-departmental publications, could have been found in Babcock had the
plaintiffs had the opportunity to engage in discovery prior to the ruling on the
12(b)(6) motion. See id.  The dissent points out that during oral arguments, plain-
tiffs had mentioned that defendant had placed restrictions on plaintiffs’ reading
materials during meal periods, as was the case in Alexander. See id.  The dissent
asserts that these facts should have been further developed, adding:
[Information regarding additional restrictions] is [another] . . . example
of an area in which factual development should have been allowed.  Nev-
ertheless, the Majority concludes that there has been “sufficient factual
development of the facts to enable a capable application of the appropri-
ate predominant benefit standard.”  Plaintiffs, however, are entitled to a
correct application of the predominant benefit standard to an appropri-
ately developed record.
Id. at 161 n.7
98. See id. (arguing that plaintiffs should have been permitted to engage in
discovery).  The dissent adds that “[e]ven if . . . the Complaint had been insuffi-
ciently pled, the dismissal still would have been improper . . . .  [B]ecause amend-
ment would not have been futile, Plaintiffs should have been given leave to
amend.” Id. at 161 n.7 (citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d
Cir. 2008)).
99. See id. at 161–62. The dissent noted:
[T]he Majority erroneously concentrates on whether, under the parties’
collective bargaining agreement . . . Plaintiffs are currently paid for a
portion of their meal period.  The Majority thereby disregards Supreme
Court precedent on the definition of work.  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ current
contractual compensation, upon which the Majority focuses, is a red her-
ring that improperly detracts from the factual allegations in the
Complaint.
Id. at 158–59 (footnote omitted).
100. See id. at 162 (arguing Leahy’s holding that CBA is defense to liability
under FLSA should not be applied to Babcock because of factual differences in
cases).  Specifically, the dissent notes that unlike in Leahy, the CBA in Babcock “ex-
plicitly precludes the arbitrator from making determination concerning compli-
ance with the FLSA.” See id. (footnote omitted).  The dissent also highlights that
even the arbitrator recognized its inability to determine FLSA claims. See id. at 162
n.8 (quoting arbitrator’s decision: “Simply stated, the CBA does not authorize an
arbitrator to resolve FLSA claims . . . I have not reviewed or considered the FLSA
in rendering an Award, and I express no opinion regarding whether or not the
FLSA has been violated.”).
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ported and may have been overturned.101  The dissent found that the ma-
jority’s reliance on Leahy was both factually and legally improper, and thus
the court should not have relied on Leahy in rejecting the plaintiffs’
claim.102
IV. TOUGH BREAK: BABCOCK’S AMBIGUOUS IMPLICATIONS AND ADVICE TO
PRACTITIONERS FOR DEALING WITH THE UNCERTAINTY
The Third Circuit’s holding in Babcock established that the compen-
sability of meal periods hinges on whom the time predominantly bene-
fits.103  While Babcock clarified the legal standard used in determining
mealtime compensation cases, how the PBT will be applied in other cases
remains uncertain because of Babcock’s unique facts and the indetermin-
able weight that the court afforded to the CBA.104  In light of both the
guidance and ambiguity left in the wake of Babcock, attorneys representing
employers should carefully create break policies and avoid over-reliance
on the existence of a CBA.105  In contrast, employees should ensure their
complaints include as much detail as possible and should carefully negoti-
ate the compensation terms of their CBAs.106
A. Stop the Clock: The Indeterminable Application of the Predominant Benefit
Test in Future Cases
While Babcock could be seen as a victory for employers because it is an
employer-friendly test for compensability, the court in Babcock made it
abundantly clear that compensability cases must be analyzed based on the
101. See id. at 159 (claiming Leahy “is inapposite to the instant case, has been
soundly rejected by the two circuits that have considered it, and has been called
into question by subsequent Supreme Court precedent” (footnote omitted)).  The
dissent explains that the Leahy holding is “questionable” following the Supreme
Court’s holding in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp. See id. at 162 (critiquing
majority’s use of Leahy) (citing Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82
(1998)).  Additionally, the dissent notes that in the nineteen years since it was
issued, “no court of appeals has followed Leahy . . . .” See id.  In fact, the dissent
highlights that the courts that have addressed Leahy have rejected and criticized
the holding. See id. (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s statement that the Leahy holding
was “improper” and contrary to Supreme Court precedent, and the First Circuit’s
holding that Leahy “conflates contractual rights with statutory ones.” (first citing
Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 263–64 (5th Cir. 1998) then citing
Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 52 n.9 (1st Cir. 2013))).
102. See id. (“Given the paucity of support for Leahy and the likelihood that its
holding did not survive Wright, the Majority’s reliance on Leahy to dismiss Plaintiffs’
claims is mistaken.”).
103. See id. at 155 (majority opinion) (declaring court intended to adopt PBT
as mechanism for ascertaining meal period compensability).
104. For a further discussion of the source of ambiguity, see infra notes
106–34 and accompanying text.
105. For additional advice to attorneys representing employers, see infra
notes 138–47 and accompanying text.
106. For additional advice to attorneys representing employees in FLSA meal-
time compensation cases, see infra notes 148–60 and accompanying text.
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totality of the circumstances.107  Due to the unique facts of Babcock and the
court’s heavy consideration of the CBA, it is challenging to predict the
results of a PBT analysis in the future.108  While Babcock added clarity to
the legal community by delineating the operative test, there is still a sub-
stantial amount of ambiguity in its application.109
1. The Unique Facts of Babcock
The facts in Babcock were unique and thus will likely provide little in-
sight into how the court would analyze a future case.110  One distinctive
element of Babcock was that it involved law enforcement personnel.111  The
court came to the conclusion that the time did not predominantly benefit
the employees by comparing Babcock to other meal compensability cases
that specifically dealt with law enforcement officers.112  While the facts in
Babcock failed the PBT, it is possible that a similar set of facts applied to
non-law enforcement personnel could be sufficient to state a claim upon
107. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157 (stating “the predominant benefit test is nec-
essarily a fact-intensive inquiry”).  Compared to the relieved of all duties approach,
the PBT is considered an employer-friendly standard because, under it, employers
may impose restrictions on employees without required compensation. See Miller
& Bider, supra note 40 (explaining that in contrast to PBT, ROAD test could mean
“a mere minute or two of work for the employer’s benefit—or a few restrictions on
an employee’s break time—can turn an entire meal break into paid time”); Rob-
ertson, supra note 23 (declaring relieved of all duties test is “much stricter, em-
ployee-friendly test than the predominant benefit test” (internal quotations
omitted)).
108. See Stanisz, supra note 54 (highlighting difficulty in applying Babcock to
other cases).
109. See id. (describing ambiguity in Babcock’s application).
110. See id. (“Babcock makes clear that, although the predominant benefit test
applies in the Third Circuit, it is not a bright-line rule.  The test turns on the
balancing of multiple factors that could lead reasonable minds to reach divergent
conclusions.”).  In addition to the fact-intensive nature of the test, it is also difficult
for employers to know how the court could rule on different cases in the future
because the facts in Babcock were unique and therefore a consistent result cannot
be expected for other cases. See Sugiura Jr., supra note 26 (“The facts in Babcock
were unique and the ruling of the Third Circuit will likely have limited application
moving forward.”).
111. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 155 (describing facts of case, particularly that
“putative class action” was on behalf of corrections officers at Butler County
Prison).
112. See id. at 157 (comparing facts of Babcock to the “cadre of case law ad-
dressing mealtime compensability in the law enforcement context”).  The majority
discusses several cases, all of which specifically address law enforcement personnel.
See, e.g., Leahy v. City of Chi., 96 F.3d 228, 230–31 (7th Cir. 1996) (concerning
police officers in Illinois); Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 1337, 1340–41 (11th
Cir. 1994) (concerning police officers in Alabama); Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sherriff
Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 533 (8th Cir. 1993) (concerning police officers in South Da-
kota); Alexander v. City of Chi., 994 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 1993) (concerning
police officers in Illinois); Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 420, 432 (10th
Cir. 1992) (discussing police officers in Kansas); Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972
F.2d 1145, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 1992) (concerning police officers in Kansas).
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which relief could be granted.113  Therefore, it is difficult to use Babcock as
a basis for determining how courts would rule in cases that do not involve
police or correction officers.114
Babcock also only considered mealtime compensability within the state
of Pennsylvania.115  Pennsylvania is a state that does not impose
mandatory meal breaks, and therefore, the court did not have to assess any
applicable state laws in weighing the PBT.116  However, some jurisdictions
in the Third Circuit, including Delaware and the United States Virgin Is-
lands, have enacted mandatory meal-break statutes.117 Babcock’s narrow
holding did not address any alterations in its analysis to integrate different
state laws.118  The court’s failure to address how its analysis may have
113. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157 (finding that plaintiffs failed to state claim by
specifically comparing facts in Babcock to other cases involving law-enforcement
personnel).  Given the highly fact-specific nature of the PBT and the court’s use of
similar cases to come to a conclusion in Babcock, it seems highly unlikely that the
court would rely on law-enforcement case law in conducting a PBT analysis as it
would apply to a non-law enforcement employee. See id.; see also Leahy, 96 F.3d at
232 (comparing its facts to Alexander). As such, the finding that Babcock failed to
state a claim would not easily lend itself to a non-law enforcement context conceiv-
ably a non-law enforcement case with similar facts could yield an opposite finding.
See also Sugiura Jr., supra note 26 (explaining uniqueness of Babcock).
114. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157 (emphasizing difficulty of applying Babcock
outside law enforcement situations because it is “fact intensive”).
115. See id. at 155 (stating defendant is located in Pennsylvania).
116. See General Wage and Hour Questions, PA. DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS., http://
www.dli.pa.gov/Individuals/Labor-Management-Relations/llc/Pages/Wage-
FAQs.aspx#10 [https://perma.cc/LN66-WCHC] (stating Pennsylvania does not
impose mandatory meal periods for employees eighteen years and older) (last vis-
ited Jan. 28, 2017).  In addition to Pennsylvania, New Jersey similarly does not
impose mandatory meal or rest periods for adult employees. See Wage and Hour
Compliance FAQs, STATE N.J., DEP’T LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., http://lwd.dol.state.nj
.us/labor/wagehour/content/wage_and_hour_compliance_faqs.html [https://
perma.cc/4XKG-LRHS] (last visited Jan. 28, 2017) (showing similar law in neigh-
boring state).
117. See 19 DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19, § 707 (West 2016) (requiring mandatory
meal breaks in Delaware); see also 24 V.I. CODE ANN. TIT. 24, § 20b (2006) (requir-
ing mandatory meal breaks in U.S. Virgin Islands).
118. See Treibman, supra note 46 (discussing how it is difficult to predict fu-
ture Third Circuit rulings after Babcock failed to address how their holding would
change in jurisdictions outside of Pennsylvania); see also Stanisz, supra note 54 (dis-
cussing limitations of Babcock).  To illustrate the significant of Babcock’s failure to
address jurisdictional differences, Stanisz comments:
It is also important to remember that applicable state wage and hour laws
may have rules and requirements that are more stringent than the FLSA’s
requirements.  By way of example, under Pennsylvania and California
wage and hour laws, when an employee is required by the employer to
remain at the employer’s premises, that time is compensable.  Under
New York law, in contrast, there is no rule that requires an employee to
be permitted to leave the work premises during an uncompensated meal
period.  Remember: employees get the benefit of federal or state law,
whichever is more favorable.
Id.
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changed if meal periods were required makes it difficult to extend the
logic of Babcock to future cases.119
2. The Undetermined Weight Assigned to the CBA
In addition to the case’s unique facts, it is unclear how much weight
the Babcock court afforded the CBA.120  The court stated that a CBA is a
relevant, yet non-determinative factor in ascertaining mealtime compen-
sability, but never elaborated on the extent to which a CBA can impact a
holding.121  Given the lack of transparency, it is unclear whether the CBA
is weighed more than, equal to, or less than the restrictions imposed upon
employees.122  It is also possible that the weight afforded to the CBA is
contingent upon the language of the CBA itself.123
Considering what the result of Babcock would have been in the ab-
sence of the CBA highlights the ambiguity associated with the CBA.124
Based on Babcock’s set of facts, one Third Circuit judge believed the facts
suggested the predominant benefit of the time was for the employer, while
the other two judges found it was for the employees.125  Considering the
CBA weighed in favor of the employer, in its absence, it is possible the
restrictions imposed on employees could have been sufficient to state a
claim for relief.126
In evaluating whether the meal period was compensable, the court
found that “although Plaintiffs face a number of restrictions . . . on bal-
119. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157–58 (constraining holding based on existence
of CBA language); see also Stanisz, supra note 54 (noting Babcock did not address
other “state wage and hour laws” which may be more “stringent” than FLSA).
120. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157 (using CBA as factor in evaluating whether
meal breaks predominantly benefit plaintiffs or defendants).
121. See id. at 158 (stating CBA is factor and in Babcock its existence was factor
in favor of affirming dismissal of suit).
122. See id. (acknowledging CBA is not dispositive factor in decision).
123. See id. at 157–58 (distinguishing Leahy because in that case CBA language
specifically covered mealtime compensation).  For instance, the court states that
because the CBA at issue in Babcock is different than the CBA at issue in Leahy, the
court would not hold that the CBA could excuse liability under the FLSA.  See id. at
158 (“Although we find the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Leahy useful for compari-
son, the Dissent is correct that the instant case is distinguishable . . . .” (citing
Leahy v. City of Chi., 96 F.3d 228, 232 (7th Cir. (1996))).  Under this language, if
the CBA in Babcock was more similar to the CBA in Leahy, it is possible the court
would have afforded additional weight to the CBA.
124. See, e.g., Peet & Batista, supra note 46 (highlighting undetermined value
of having CBA in mealtime compensation claim).
125. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 153 (majority opinion); id. at 158 (Greenaway, J.,
dissenting).
126. See id. at 157–58 (majority opinion) (finding CBA weighs in favor of find-
ing time is break because CBA already provides for compensation in event employ-
ees are working during that time). But see id. at 159 (Greenaway, J., dissenting)
(arguing that plaintiffs complaint is sufficient and should at least entitle them to
discovery period).
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ance, these restrictions did not predominantly benefit the employer.”127
This language could be interpreted in divergent ways.128  First, it was possi-
ble that the restrictions alone were insufficient to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.129  This would mean that the existence of the CBA
did not impact the holding; however, the phrase “on balance” could indi-
cate that the court was considering the CBA in concluding the restrictions
were insufficient to state a claim.130  Under this reading, the absence of a
CBA could have changed the court’s holding. It is unknown which of
these two readings of the court’s language is correct, and as such, it is
unclear how much weight the CBA in Babcock was afforded, and how the
presence of a CBA could affect future holdings.131
B. Not on My Watch: Advice to Practitioners Protecting Both Employers and
Employees in FLSA Mealtime Compensation Cases
In assessing mealtime compensation practices, practitioners should
consider both the holding in Babcock and its indeterminable applicability
to future cases.132  Employers can avoid litigation by remaining cautious
when constructing their meal policies, ensuring limited restrictions during
breaks, and avoiding overreliance on the existence of a CBA in defending
an FLSA compensation claim.133  In contrast, employees can increase
their chances of obtaining compensation for break time by ensuring their
complaints contain as much information as possible and by carefully nego-
tiating their CBAs to include compensation for breaks.134
127. See id. at 157 (majority opinion) (evaluating restrictions imposed on
employees).
128. See infra notes 132–34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two
potential interpretations of the court’s holding.
129. See Babcock, 608 F.3d at 161 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (arguing that ma-
jority’s interpretation of who mealtime restrictions benefitted could easily cut for
other side). But see Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1156–58 (10th Cir.
1992) (reasoning that relatively similar restrictions placed on officers as were
placed on plaintiffs in Babcock were grounds for finding that mealtime predomi-
nately benefited employer).
130. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 158 (“We have been advised at argument that the
CBA is soon to expire.  During the collective bargaining for the new contract, the
parties will have a fresh opportunity to consider the issue of compensation for the
fifteen minutes in this case.”).
131. See, e.g., Voegele, Jr., supra note 48 (advising employers to be wary of
reliance on CBAs because it is unclear how much weight CBAs have in court’s
analysis).
132. See, e.g., Peet & Batista, supra note 46 (advising employers on implica-
tions of Babcock).
133. See, e.g., Voegele, Jr., supra note 48 (“[W]hile a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement addressing compensation for meal break time will likely
weigh in the employer’s favor should its meal break pay practice be challenged,
employers cannot assume that a such a provision will serve as a silver bullet.”).  For
an analysis of how Babcock impacts employers in meal period compensation cases,
see supra notes 138–47 and accompanying text.
134. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 161 n.7 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (noting that
plaintiffs raised fact that their permissible reading materials were limited at breaks
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1. Sticks and Stones May Break Your Bones, But a Break Could Hurt Your
Wallet: Advice to Practitioners Counseling Employers on Avoiding
Liability Under the FLSA
Under Babcock, employers can impose some restrictions upon employ-
ees’ meal breaks.135  However, once the break is essentially no longer the
employee’s own, employers must provide compensation.136  A potential
FLSA violation could pose significant liability to employers, especially
when a class action is possible.137  As a result, employers must ensure that
their meal period policies comply with the guidance from Babcock and
should be aware that a CBA is not a shield from a finding of
compensability.138
To reduce exposure to liability, employers should ensure that their
employees are aware that the meal period is the employee’s own time, and
and that if such facts were established through discovery or alleged in complaint,
then plaintiffs may have prevailed).  For an analysis of how Babcock impacts employ-
ees in meal period compensation cases, see infra notes 148–60 and accompanying
text.
135. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157 (majority opinion) (finding that meal period
predominantly benefited employees despite existence of variety of restrictions on
the employees break period); see also Stanisz, supra note 54 (explaining PBT “may
be a powerful employer defense that will enable an employer to maintain uncom-
pensated meal periods and still impose some restrictions on their usage (at least
under federal law)”).
136. See Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 65–66 (2d Cir.
1997) (explaining that when “workers’ on-site presence (during lunch time) is
solely for the benefit of the employer” then FLSA liability is proper); Voegele, Jr.,
supra note 48 (explaining that employers should ensure that “on balance” meal
breaks predominately benefit employees).
137. See Long, supra note 22 (“Meal break cases present significant liability
concerns for employers, as they easily can become class action lawsuits covering
many employees”); see also Meal and Rest Breaks, WORKPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG, http://
www.workplacefairness.org/meal-rest-breaks [https://perma.cc/Y2YT-X3LB] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2016) (explaining liability for FLSA violation for mealtime compen-
sation could include back wages and liquidated damages, which could potentially
double amount of total damages employer must pay, along with attorney’s fees and
court costs).  Additionally, it is important to note, even if an employer is likely to
win a suit, the employer is still likely to “incur large litigation costs to prevail.” See
Stanisz, supra note 54 (discussing drawbacks of FLSA litigation).
138. See Sisk & Siler, supra note 45 (advising employers to ensure their poli-
cies “reflect [their] intent to pay employees for all hours worked” and recom-
mending that employers shift burden of reporting time adjustments to
employees); see also Franz Espan˜ol, Third Circuit Adopts ‘Predominant Benefit’ Test for
Paid Meal Breaks Under FLSA, FOX ROTHSCHILD (Dec. 10 2015), http://www.fox
rothschild.com/labor-employment/publications/third-circuit-adopts-predomi
nant-benefit-test-for-paid-meal-breaks-under-flsa/ [https://perma.cc/9UB8-4MX
H] (explaining that as result of Babcock, “[e]mployers should be mindful of what
their meal break policy says, how the policy is implemented, and whether other
workplace policies interfere with employees’ meal breaks”); Voegele Jr., supra note
48 ( “[W]hile a provision in a collective bargaining agreement addressing compen-
sation for meal break time will likely weigh in the employer’s favor should its meal
break pay practice be challenged, employers cannot assume that such a provision
will serve as a silver bullet.”).
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the break does not need to occur at the employee’s desk or worksta-
tion.139  If feasible, employers should also permit employees to leave the
work site, relieve employees of the duty of responding to emergencies, and
avoid additional restrictions such as forbidding an employee from resting
during their break or having an overly broad restriction on permissible
reading material.140  In general, the more the employees can use the
break as they wish, the less likely the company is violating the FLSA.141
Additionally, employers should not over rely on the existence of a
CBA in protecting them from FLSA liability.142 Babcock made clear that a
CBA is only one factor in determining compensability, and given the dis-
sent’s strong opposition to the use of the CBA at all, it is possible that a
case with a CBA and slightly altered facts from Babcock could be sufficient
for a plaintiff to state a claim for relief.143  A CBA will not act as an impen-
etrable shield in future cases, and thus employers should ensure that, in
139. See Voegele, Jr., supra note 48 (analyzing employer meal time rules for
compliance after Babcock).  In determining that the meal period at issue in Babcock
was not compensable, the court emphasized that employees were not required to
eat at their desks. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157.  Additionally, the DOL regulation
specifically states that “an office employee who is required to eat at his desk or a
factory worker who is required to be at his machine is working while eating.” See 29
C.F.R. § 785.19(a) (2016).  As such, employers should be exceptionally careful to
ensure their employees are not eating in their workspace, considering such a re-
striction would likely fail the PBT. See Minehan, supra note 39 (suggesting employ-
ers reduce liability by “incorporating meal break policies into employee
handbooks, considering stand-alone acknowledgment forms through which em-
ployees certify they understand meal break policies, and ensuring time sheets have
language within them that indicates the employee agrees he or she has worked all
hours indicated and taken all meal breaks as specified”).
140. See, e.g., Peet & Batista, supra note 46 (recommending employers should
allow employees to “leave the premises, take naps, run personal errands, or social-
ize”); see also Roberts, supra note 26 (advising employers to “state clearly that the
meal period is the employees’ time to take break”); Share, supra note 47 (recom-
mending employers who seek to avoid potential liability under Babcock and FLSA
relieve employees of “readiness to act” such that employees “are not expected to
be called back to their duties to serve during uncompensated meal times”);
Suguira Jr., supra note 26 (stating that absent CBA, employer requiring employees
to be on call may violate FLSA).
141. See, e.g., Sisk & Siler, supra note 45 (recognizing that more restrictions on
an employees’ personal freedom during break, more likely meal period will be
considered compensable work).
142. See Peet & Batista, supra note 46 (advising employers to not rely too heav-
ily on CBAs in determining whether they are likely to prevail in meal time compen-
sation case, commenting “given the dissent’s position on the effect of a collective
bargaining agreement and case law clearly establishing that parties may not con-
tract to evade federal law, employers should be wary of relying on a collective bar-
gaining agreement”); see also Treibman, supra note 46 (“[O]ne of the three judges
who heard the case dissented from the ruling in strong terms, and his dissent
could play a role in how the case is ultimately viewed.”).
143. Cf. Babcock, 806 F.3d at 158 (considering CBA to be non-dispositive factor
in determining whether predominant benefit of break incurs to employee or
employer).
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addition to the existence of a CBA, their company policies do not place
too many restrictions on meal periods.144
2. Have a Happy Meal: Recommendations to Attorneys Representing Employees’
Rights to Time and Compensation
In Babcock, the plaintiffs did not include the fact that they were lim-
ited in their permissive reading materials during mealtime in their com-
plaint.145  Under a 12(b)(6) motion, judges are only to consider the
complaint itself, so the court did not consider any additional facts, such as
the reading material restriction.146  As a result, the court concluded based
on only the facts listed in the complaint that the plaintiffs had failed to
state a claim.147  The plaintiffs’ failure to include the reading material re-
striction in their complaint was detrimental, as the court used that factor
to distinguish Babcock from Alexander, where the restrictions converted the
meal period into time that predominantly benefited the employer.148
The plaintiffs’ failure to include all restrictions in their complaint
made it more difficult for them to survive the 12(b)(6) motion.149  As was
144. See Peet & Batista, supra note 46 (emphasizing that employers should not
rely on existence of CBA to defend against FLSA violation); Voegele, Jr., supra note
48 (advising CBA language is not “silver bullet” to FLSA liability).
145. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 161, n.7 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (noting fact
that employees faced restrictions on reading materials was revealed during plain-
tiffs’ oral argument).  The complaint asserted that plaintiffs were unpaid for a fif-
teen-minute period, were not allowed to leave the prison, were not permitted go
outside, were not permitted to run personal errands, were restricted from sleeping
during the break, had to remain on-call, and had to respond to emergencies in
uniform with emergency response gear. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 5, Babcock v.
Butler Cty., 806 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 2:12CV00394).
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).  In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, courts must
evaluate whether “under any reasonable reading of the pleadings”, the plaintiff is
entitled to relief; in making this evaluation, courts are to “accept as true the factual
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn there-
from.” See, e.g., Naim v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Holder v. City
of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)).  A court will dismiss a 12(b)(6)
motion for alleging sufficient facts if the complaint “adequately put the defendants
on notice of the essential elements of the plaintiffs’ cause of action.” See id.  In
assessing the 12(b)(6) motion, courts must consider the pleadings, but may also
consider additional information derived from public record, orders, and exhibits
attached to the complaint. See, e.g., Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman,
38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994).
147. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 158 (majority opinion) (affirming dismissal of
case under 12(b)(6)).
148. See id. at 157 (emphasizing that facts pled in plaintiffs’ complaint did not
demonstrate that time predominantly benefited the employer).  The court justi-
fied this determination by comparing the facts of Babcock to that of Alexander, com-
menting that the plaintiffs in that case “were required to receive permission to take
a meal period,” a fact also present in Babcock, but the officers were also “not per-
mitted to read nondepartmental publications.” See id. (quoting Alexander v. City
of Chi., 994 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 1993)).
149. See id.  Had the plaintiffs included the restriction in their complaint, it
would have been more difficult for the majority to differentiate Babcock from Alex-
ander.  While the addition would have made it more likely the plaintiffs would have
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emphasized in Babcock, plaintiffs might not be given an opportunity to en-
gage in additional discovery, increasing the importance of a detailed
pleading.150  Thus, to decrease the chances of losing to an opposing
party’s 12(b)(6) motion, employees filing suit against their employer for
mealtime compensation claims must be extremely careful to include all
relevant restrictions in their pleadings.151  If there are any pertinent re-
strictions, such as the reading material limitation in Babcock, they should
be included in the complaint.152
Next, employees should be wary of the terms and phrases included in
their CBAs because a CBA may be a double-edged sword: sometimes a
CBA protects compensation, while other times, such as in Babcock, the CBA
is a factor that prevents compensation.153  The court in Babcock used the
CBA as a factor that weighed against a finding for the plaintiffs, arguing
that the CBA protected the plaintiffs by ensuring compensation if employ-
ees worked during breaks.154  As such, one threat for potential plaintiffs is
that the terms of their CBAs could decrease their chances of prevailing on
their compensation FLSA claim.155  This concern is exacerbated given the
undetermined weight the court gave the CBA in Babcock; therefore, em-
ployees should be extremely cautious when negotiating the terms of their
prevailed, whether they would have actually done so is unclear given the court’s
unquantified consideration of the CBA as a relevant factor in determining com-
pensability. See id. at 158.  If the court would still affirm the 12(b)(6) motion even
with the reading restriction in the complaint, it would indicate that the CBA is
granted a substantial amount of weight in coming to a conclusion.
150. See id. at 159 (Greenaway, J., dissenting) (commenting that majority
wrongly failed to permit plaintiffs to engage in discovery to gain “access to the facts
and circumstances” that could help them state claim upon which relief could be
granted).
151. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
importance of plaintiffs’ inclusion of all relevant restrictions in their complaints.
152. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 161 n.7 (discussing that reading material restric-
tions were absent from complaint but mentioned during plaintiffs’ oral
argument).
153. See generally id. 162 n.8 (explaining how arbitrator expressed no opinion
on how CBA language affected mealtime compensation under FLSA; thus, leading
to inference that majority overvalued language in CBA).
154. See id. at 158 (majority opinion) (noting that although CBA does not
specifically address compensability of fifteen minute period during break, it re-
quires compensation if employee is required to work during break).
155. See Minehan, supra note 39 (cautioning plaintiffs in such cases).  A plain-
tiff’s CBA could make it more difficult to survive a 12(b)(6) motion if, for exam-
ple, the plaintiff’s CBA contained a similar provision to that in Babcock where the
specific period of time is not addressed, but there is a provision that requires com-
pensation for time worked. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 157–58.  Nevertheless, a CBA
which designates a time period specifically as a break would also make it more
difficult to survive a 12(b)(6) motion because the court has stated it will consider
“the agreed-upon characterization” of a time period “as a factor in analyzing to
whom the predominant benefit of the period inures.” See id. at 158.  Therefore, if
a period of time is not compensated for under the CBA because it is considered a
break, the court may consider that characterization in determining whether the
time predominantly serves the employee or employer.
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CBAs.156  If employees that are given breaks with substantial restrictions
have the opportunity, they should renegotiate the terms of the CBA to
provide for compensation during that time.157
V. CLOCKING OUT: SUMMING UP THE IMPACT OF BABCOCK’S HOLDING
The Third Circuit’s holding in Babcock established that whether a
meal period predominantly benefits the employee or the employer deter-
mines whether the time is compensable.158  In coming to this conclusion,
the court considered the restrictions imposed upon employees and the
existence of a collective bargaining agreement between the parties.159
While Babcock provided some clarity to mealtime compensation cases by
formally adopting the PBT, it is still difficult to predict how courts will rule
in other cases.160 In the aftermath of Babcock, practitioners should be
aware of the factors the court considered, as well as the uncertainty that
remains.161
156. See generally Peet & Batista, supra note 46 (discussing concerns resulting
from Babcock).
157. See Babcock, 806 F.3d at 158 (suggesting that because CBA would shortly
expire, during renegotiations for CBA, plaintiffs should consider arguing for com-
pensation for fifteen-minute period at issue where plaintiffs are not compensated,
yet still required to remain on site, in uniform, and prepared to respond to
emergencies).
158. See id. at 156 (announcing court’s intention to utilize PBT).
159. See id. at 157–58 (declaring that PBT is fact-intensive inquiry that consid-
ers specific restrictions imposed as well as existence of CBA).
160. For a discussion of why the court’s holding in Babcock does not shed sig-
nificant light on how courts will analyze future cases, see supra notes 106–34 and
accompanying text.
161. For advice to employers on avoiding mealtime compensation cases fol-
lowing Babcock, see supra notes 138–47 and accompanying text.  For advice to em-
ployees on how to litigate a mealtime compensation claim, see supra notes 148–60
and accompanying text.
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